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INTRODUCTION
The concept of consequential damages is commonplace in both
contract and tort law. 1 In the perennial of first year contract
cases, Hadley v. Baxendale,2 students learn that the party
breaching a contract is liable not only for the immediate loss
caused by the breach, but for all losses which the party had rea-
sonable notice of at the time of contract formation. 3 In another
first year perennial, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 4 stu-
dents learn that a tortfeasor is liable for all losses that are a rea-
sonably foreseeable result of his conduct. The tortfeasor, how-
ever, is not liable for those losses which are not reasonably
foreseeable, even though they are actually caused by him.
Each of these fundamental cases played a part in establishing
an important rule to deal with the reality that misconduct can
cause a number of harms, each of which in turn can cause other
harms, and so on ad infinitum down the chain of causation.
Each rule occupies a middle ground, which does not unfairly
limit damages to the most immediate result of the misconduct.
Likewise, each does not run to the other extreme and allow re-
covery for every conceivable consequence of the misconduct. Un-
fortunately, unlike contract and tort law, antitrust law does not
have such a defined rule concerning damages. For the past hun-
dred years, the Sherman Act has governed antitrust law. 5 Since
this jurisprudence spans many decades, one would think that
there would be an established rule governing the availability of
consequential damages in antitrust cases. Traditionally, there
has been such a rule, albeit one rarely discussed. Recently, how-
ever, the issue of consequential damages has become clouded due
to a number of new innovations in antitrust doctrine that have
1 The term "consequential damages" is frequently used in contracts cases. See Devel-
opments in the Law - Damages, 61 HARV. L. REV. 113, 116-18 (1947). Sometimes courts
use the phrase "general damages" to refer to those damages that automatically follow
from a finding of liability and "special damages" to refer to those that do not. Id. The
general versus special nomenclature is most prevalent in tort cases. Id.
2 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 (1854).
3 For purposes of this article, immediate damages in antitrust cases will be called
"direct damages" while those analogous to other losses will be called "consequential dam-
ages."
4 248 N.Y. 339 (1928); see also Van beet v. Kilmer, 252 N.Y. 454, 455 (1930)
(requiring foresight when determining liability for losses).
5 See Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1-7 (1998)).
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caused unexpected and sometimes contradictory results.
In order to make these issues more concrete, we will illustrate
the problem with a recurring hypothetical. Suppose Jane runs a
fruit stand at an offramp on the interstate highway. There she
sells three items: Oranges, fresh-squeezed orange juice, and ap-
ples. A cartel of orange producers, called Moonkissed, engages in
anticompetitive conduct that restrains the market for oranges. 6
This behavior may consist, for example, of a refusal to deal with
Jane or predatory pricing. Lastly, such anticompetitive behavior
concerns only fresh oranges themselves and does not immedi-
ately involve fresh-squeezed orange juice. As a result, Jane can
no longer sell oranges or fresh-squeezed orange juice. Without
the revenue from those sales, Jane goes out of business alto-
gether. 7
Clearly, Jane can recover her lost profits from the sale of or-
anges because those are direct damages. The issue arises, how-
ever, whether she can recover the profits lost on the sale of the
fresh-squeezed orange juice. One consideration in answering
that question is whether it matters if fresh-squeezed orange juice
occupies a separate market from that for fresh oranges. 8 In ad-
dition, another issue unresolved is whether Jane can recover her
lost profits from the sale of apples. 9 Finally, should it matter if
6 See id. In relevant part, the Sherman Act reads:
Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal.
Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony...
Id.
7 The analysis would be the same if Jane remained in business, but the sales of or-
ange juice and apples were reduced because of her loss of orange sales. Such an effect
might occur if Jane lost some customers who would have come to the fruit stand for or-
anges and also bought orange juice or apples while they were there. Nevertheless, the
hypothetical focuses on the more factually pristine situation where a plaintiff is driven
out of business altogether. Thus the factual link between the misconduct affecting one
category of products and the loss of sale of other products is readily apparent.
8 Generally, to prove an antitrust violation, except in per se cases brought under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must establish, first, what the relevant market
is, and second, that the defendant(s) had monopoly or market power in that relevant
market. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 297 n.9 (1985) (finding necessary showing of some kind of restraint on
competition was lacking); Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1112 (1st
Cir. 1994) (requiring harm to competitors in order to be violative of antitrust laws).
9 The issue of consequential damages might conceivably arise in cases brought by
consumers, but this article focuses on the issue where it usually arises. In cases brought
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Moonkissed also sells orange juice or apples?
This article considers the issue of whether, and under what
circumstances, consequential damages are available in antitrust
cases. Part I of this article addresses the question of consequen-
tial damages under the doctrine of proximate cause. Part I also
demonstrates that consequential damages are available when
proximate cause is established. Part II analyzes the issue under
the recent doctrine of antitrust injury and considers the argu-
ments for and against the availability of consequential damages
under this doctrine. Moreover, Part II further concludes that
consequential damages are available so long as the plaintiff es-
tablishes antitrust injury in connection with her direct damages.
Part III discusses limitations on who may recover consequential
damages under the doctrine of antitrust standing. Part IV ana-
lyzes the difficulties in proving the proper amount of antitrust
consequential damages in light of the disaggregation doctrine.
The article concludes with a recommendation of the proper stan-
dard to be used in evaluating antitrust consequential damages.
I. PROXIMATE CAUSE
Antitrust law was originally considered a codification of the
common law.10 Conduct restraining trade could thus be analo-
gized to other torts. For example, conduct that restrains trade
may harm others in much the same way that trespass or battery
does. 11  Consequently, it is not surprising that courts have
adopted the tort concept of proximate cause to determine the ap-
propriate scope of antitrust damages. 12 Under this analysis,
by a defendant's competitors or others in the chain of distribution of the products of the
defendant or a competitor of defendant.
10 See Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (concluding
that standard of reason applied at common law was intended to be measure used for pur-
pose of determining whether certain conduct violates Sherman Act). See generally Donald
Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust-Policy, 41 VA. L. REV. 759, 759 (1955)
(discussing creation of Sherman Act as codifying common law antitrust principals);
Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YALE
L.J. 42, 42 (1926) (discussing early common law antitrust policies in colonial America).
11 See Dewey, supra note 12, at 760-61 (discussing use of reasonable test used in
common law tort cases to determine harm caused by restraint on trade).
12 See William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1445, 1450-51 (1985). The article analogizes the appropriate scope of liability in an-
titrust to the proximate cause doctrine in tort law. Id. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors of Cal., Inc., v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 532 (1983). Al-
though particular common-law limitations were not debated in Congress, the frequent
references to common-law principles imply that Congress simply assumed that antitrust
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plaintiffs are entitled to recover all damages proximately caused
by the antitrust violation once it is proven. 13
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co.14 demonstrated the proximate
cause standard as it relates to consequential damages. This
standard allows for consequential damages as a matter of course
when the nexus between the misconduct and the loss is suffi-
ciently close. In Perkins, the plaintiff recovered lost profits on
gasoline sales that could not be made due to the defendant's
predatory pricing scheme. Since the defendant's pricing scheme
concerned the price for gasoline itself, the lost profits component
of the plaintiffs damages constituted direct, rather than conse-
quential damages. Moreover, the Court held that the plaintiff
could recover for items such as loss of brokerage fees, rental on
service station leases, and other indebtedness proximately
caused by the defendant's predatory pricing. These damages
were clearly consequential rather than direct. The Court rea-
soned that they were nevertheless recoverable because the
plaintiff "was entitled to present evidence of all of his losses to
the jury."15
The Perkins Court did not address the concept of consequential
damages as explicitly as it might have if it had thought it was
dealing with a controversial concept. Indeed, few courts have
approached antitrust consequential damages with the recogni-
tion that the subject is hotly disputed as a conceptual matter.
Given the familiarity of consequential damage doctrine in tort
law, there generally has not been a perceived need to examine
how these damages work in the antitrust context. 16
damages litigation would be subject to constraints comparable to well-accepted common-
law rules applied in comparable litigation. Id.
13 See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 697
(1962) (stating jury can infer causal relation exists where plaintiff proves a loss that anti-
trust violation would be likely to cause); see also Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d
416, 436 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating plaintiff may recover "damages proximately caused by
an antitrust violation.") See, e.g., First Nationwide Bank v. Celt Fund Corp., 27 F.3d 763,
799 (2nd Cir. 1984) (describing proximate cause as "reasonably foreseeable" or "anticipate
as a natural consequence").
14 395 U.S. 642, 649-50 (1969) (concluding that injured party must show causal con-
nection between price discrimination and injury suffered in order to recover damages).
15 See id. at 650. In antitrust circles, any cases predating the late 1970's are some-
times derided as an "old case," presumably bereft of Chicago School enlightenment. But
the Supreme Court demonstrated that its 1969 decision in Perkins is still good law when
it cited the case as authority for affirming an antitrust damages award in 1990 in Texaco
Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1990), where the Court upheld the principle of
Perkins notwithstanding "additional link to the distribution chain."
16 For example, many courts have awarded a plaintiff the going concern value of her
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Several circuit court cases, however, have discussed the issue
in more depth than Perkins. For example, in Greene v. General
Foods Corp.,17 a distributorship, terminated as a result of the
manufacturer's anticompetitive conduct, was awarded not only
lost profits resulting from the loss of that manufacturer's product
lines (direct damages), but also lost profits from the loss of the
manufacturer's other product lines. 18 Applying this holding to
our hypothetical, Jane would be allowed to recover for the lost
orange juice and apple sales that occurred as a result of the car-
tel's anticompetitive behavior. Furthermore, in Graphic Prods.
Distrib. v. Itek Corp.,19 the court acknowledged that under
Greene, a distributorship that is improperly terminated due to
anticompetitive behavior by the manufacturer may be able to re-
cover losses suffered in other product lines (consequential dam-
ages) if the jury concludes that these losses were proximately
caused by the termination. 20
Both the Greene and Graphic holdings have been embodied in
the jury instructions typically issued in antitrust cases: 21
business when she was driven out of business as a result of defendant's anticompetitive
conduct. See, e.g., Copy-Data Systs., Inc. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 663 F.2d 405 (2d Cir.
1981), rev'd 755 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1985); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 46-47
(5th Cir. 1972). The "courts are to take a charitable view of the difficulties of proving
damages.., when.., a plaintiff must try to prove what would have accrued to him in
the absence of the defendant's anti-competitive practice." Id.; Farmington Dowel Prods.
Co. v. Foster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 80 (1st Cir. 1969). A damage award is confined to
profits lost to date plus going concern value at that date when plaintiff went out of busi-
ness. Id. It is unclear from the factual discussions in the above cases whether plaintiffs
business contained any sources of revenue other than those in the market directly af-
fected by the anticompetitive conduct. To the extent such other sources of revenue were
incorporated into the going concern value, these courts awarded consequential damages,
albeit without discussion.
17 517 F.2d 635, 660-66 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding evidence to support injury both with
respect to lost profits and overall diminution of plaintiffs business).
18 See id. at 660-66; see also Skor-Line Rambler, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp.,
543 F.2d 601, 604 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that "to be meaningful, such damages must in-
clude the amount of money that the dealer could have obtained in the future from the
profits form his franchise").
19 717 F.2d 1560, 1583 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that court could not assume lost prof-
its are never recoverable).
20 See id. at 1583; see also Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845, 864 (5th Cir.
1981) (allowing proof of lost profits to be jury question); Godix Equipment Export Corp. v.
Caterpillar Inc., 948 F.Supp. 1570, 1582 (S.D. Fla. 1996), affd, 144 F.3d 55 (11th Cir.
1998) (holding that "a plaintiffs damages in a lost profits antitrust case are simply the
profits that a plaintiff would have made in a competitive market absent the effect of the
antitrust activity").
21 See Sample Jury Instructions in Civil Antitrust Cases, Prepared by a Task Force of
the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association (William A. Montgomery
et. al. 1990).
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If you find that plaintiff has been injured by an antitrust
violation committed by defendant, the law provides that
plaintiff should be fairly compensated for all damages to its
business and property which were a direct result or likely
consequence of the conduct which you have found to be un-
lawful.22
Similarly, the instruction on "Lost Profits" states that a
"[p]laintiff is entitled to recover any profits it lost as a result of
an antitrust violation caused by defendant. '23 Consequently,
antitrust law and tort law share the characteristic that juries,
not courts, determine as a factual matter whether the causal
link between the defendant's misconduct and a given item of
damage is sufficiently close for the plaintiff to recover. 24
Although no court has explicitly held that consequential dam-
ages are unavailable as a matter of law in antitrust cases, this
does not ensure that the courts will always award consequential
damages when sought. In fact, some courts have found conse-
quential damages unavailable on the facts of a particular case
before them. 25 These rulings, however, do not undermine the le-
gal proposition that such damages are available upon a proper
factual showing.
II. ANTITRUST INJURY
The issue of consequential damages would be unworthy of dis-
cussion if the proximate cause doctrine was the only element of
consideration in antitrust cases. Other antitrust doctrines of
more recent vintage, however, appear to have muddied the oth-
erwise clear application of the proximate cause standard to the
issue of consequential damages. Foremost among these recent
22 See id. at F-9 (emphasis added).
23 See id. at F-14 (emphasis added).
24 Of course, once the facts are established beyond dispute, a court will review
whether, as a matter of law, the connection is sufficiently close to warrant recovery, but
the applicable legal standard of proximate cause is so deferential to the factual finding
that the fact-finder's determination will rarely be assailable for legal infirmity.
25 See Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 661 F. Supp. 1448,
1479-80 (D. Wyo. 1987), aff'd. in part and rev'd. in part, 885 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1989)(noting that plaintiff made no showing as to how the defendant's attempt to monopolize
natural gas produced in Wyoming, for transmission out of state, caused plaintiff to lose
sales on natural gas not produced in Wyoming and not shipped out of state); see also
H.J., Inc. v. ITT Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1549-50 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding that plaintiff
made no showing that defendant's predatory pricing caused plaintiffs losses).
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doctrines is "antitrust injury," first articulated by the Supreme
Court in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.26
A. The Content of the Antitrust Injury Doctrine
The Court in Brunswick held that a prerequisite for recovering
damages under the antitrust laws 27 is that a:
[P]laintiff must prove [the existence] of antitrust injury,
which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were in-
tended to prevent and that flows from that which makes de-
fendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anti-
competitive effect either of the violation or of the
anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. 28
Furthermore, in order to constitute antitrust injury, the
plaintiffs injury must be "attributable to an anti-competitive as-
pect of the practice under scrutiny. ' 29 Since the Sherman Act's
focus is on consumer welfare, it has been stated that "antitrust
injury occurs only when the claimed injury flows from acts harm-
ful to consumers."30 In other words, "[tihe restriction or distor-
tion of consumer choice by reason of the antitrust defendant's
conduct in the market is the essence of antitrust injury."31
26 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (setting forth "antitrust injury" as type of injury that an-
titrust laws were intended to prevent); see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,
479 U.S. 104, 108-10 (1986) (indicating that to recover, plaintiffs must prove type of in-jury antitrust laws were designed to prevent, namely an "antitrust injury").
27 See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 15). This section governs award of damages in antitrust cases. Id.
28 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 489 n.14. In Bruns-
wick, the Supreme Court, after defining "antitrust injury," observed that its definition:
[D]oes not necessarily mean.., that § 4 plaintiffs must prove an actual lessening of
competition in order to recover. The short-term effect of certain anticompetitive be-
havior-predatory below-cost pricing, for example-may be to stimulate price com-
petition. But competitors may be able to prove antitrust injury before they actually
are driven from the market and competition is thereby lessened. Of course, the case
for relief will be strongest where competition has been diminished.
Id.; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969). The
Court, when applying its definition to the facts of a particular case, found "antitrust in-jury" in conspiring to exclude prospective patent licensee's from the Canadian market.
Id.
29 See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (finding
plaintiffs claimed injuries were direct result and intended objective of defendant's price-
fixing scheme); see also State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 118 S.Ct. 275, 287 (1997) (indicating that
vertical maximum price fixing should be evaluated under rule of reason to determine ex-
istence of anticompetitive conduct).
30 See Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1445 (9th Cir. 1993)
(finding plaintiff alleging "primary-line discrimination" must prove antitrust injury by
showing injury flows from effects of conduct that are harmful to consumer welfare).
31 See Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 34 F.3d 1091, 1101 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting "overall con-
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However, the importance of the antitrust injury requirement
was underscored in 1990 when the Supreme Court decided At-
lantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. ("ARCO"). 32 In ARCO,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in vertical price-
fixing, a practice then considered per se illegal under any cir-
cumstances. 33 The Court held that the plaintiff, absent proof of
price predation, did not suffer antitrust injury. The Court rea-
soned that any increase in the defendant's prices would benefit
the plaintiffs ability to lure customers away from the defendant,
and that any non-predatory decrease in the defendant's prices
constituted price competition which is conduct to be praised
rather than condemned under the antitrust laws. 34 ARCO is es-
pecially important since before its decision the antitrust injury
requirement could be interpreted as merely a method to elimi-
nate claims that were substantively weak.35 The ARCO decision
made clear that even claims that are substantively strong will
not always result in a favorable outcome to a party whose injury
is unrelated to the harmful effect on competition.
In this respect, ARCO and other Supreme Court cases over the
last twenty years, such as Brunswick and Associated General
Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters,36 display
an interesting trend. Although it has become commonplace to
note that the overall trend has favored defendants, the Supreme
Court has actually changed the substantive aspect of antitrust
sumer preferences in setting output and prices is more important than higher prices and
lower output, per se, in determining whether there has been an injury to competition"
(citing NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 107
(1984))).
32 495 U.S. at 331 (holding plaintiff did not satisfy requirement of proving antitrust
injury).
33 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 164 (1968). The Court held that verti-
cally imposed maximum price-fixing is per se illegal. Id.; see also Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 374-75 (1911). Similarly, the Court ruled that
vertically imposed scheme to fix minimum prices is per se illegal. But see Kahn, 118 S.Ct.
at 281. The Court in Kahn overruled Albrecht, holding that vertical maximum price-
fixing is not per se illegal, but would be analyzed under the Rule of Reason. Id. The Court
found it "difficult to maintain that vertically-imposed maximum prices could harm con-
sumers or competition to the extent necessary to justify their per se invalidation." Id.
Currently, however, vertical minimum price-fixing is still per se unlawful. Id.
34 See Atlantic Richfield, 495 U.S. at 337-38 (holding vertical, maximum price fixing
agreement, while unlawful under Sherman Act, does not cause antitrust injury unless it
results in predatory pricing).
35 See Robert Taylor, Antitrust Standing: It's Growing-or More Accurately it's Shrink-
ing - Dimensions, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 515, 516 (1986) (stating that antitrust injury re-
quirement may only be method of eliminating substantively weak claims).
36 459 U.S. 519, 536-37 (1983).
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law less than practitioners realize. Rather than altering the
substantive law, the Court has focused on procedural mecha-
nisms, such as antitrust injury, to prevent private plaintiffs from
using the substantive law to their advantage in a way that the
Court believes would not enhance the competitive process. 37
The rise of the antitrust injury doctrine may have a potentially
significant impact on antitrust consequential damage claims.
Indeed, the authors have seen defendants argue that the anti-
trust injury requirement essentially overrules the proximate
cause line of authority and renders consequential damages un-
available as a matter of law. As of yet, there is surprisingly little
authority squarely addressing this point. This article will con-
sider next the arguments that would be asserted by the defen-
dant, and then the plaintiff, if the hypothetical case of Jane v.
Moonkissed reached the courts.
B. Antitrust Injury and Consequential Damages: The
Defendant's Argument Against Recovery
Defendants arguing against recovery of consequential damages
seek to impose a number of antitrust injury requirements, each
of which must be established independently for each component
of damages. In our hypothetical, Moonkissed would argue that
Jane must not only show antitrust injury to recover for her loss
of orange sales, but must also make an independent showing of
antitrust injury with respect to orange juice and apples in order
to recover for these losses.
Moonkissed would cite to the antitrust injury cases discussed
previously, focusing on the language that a plaintiff can recover
only for "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts
unlawful."38 Moonkissed could further seize upon this language
from the ARCO case:
37 See, e.g., Norman W. Hawker, The New Antitrust Paradox - Antitrust Injury, 44
RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 101 (1991) (arguing vociferously that not only should Arco be over-
ruled, but also that antitrust injury requirement should be abandoned in its entirety).
38 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (holding
injury should reflect anticompetitive effect either of violation or anticompetitive acts
made possible by violation); see also Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 483
n.19 (1982) (indicating that relationship between claimed injury and defendant's unlaw-
ful conduct is one factor considered in determining redressability of particular form of
injury).
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[A]n antitrust defendant's misconduct] may have three ef-
fects, often interwoven: In some respects the conduct may
reduce competition, in other respects it may increase com-
petition, and in still other respects effects may be neutral as
to competition. The antitrust injury requirement ensures
that a plaintiff can recover only if the loss stems from a [sic]
competition-reducing aspect or effect of the defendant's be-
havior.39
Moonkissed would attempt to link this language to cases
stating that harm to competition can generally be evaluated only
after a relevant market has been defined and the defendant's
market (or monopoly) power assessed.40
Relying upon these general principles, Moonkissed could then
argue that Jane cannot show antitrust injury for her lost apple
sales unless she demonstrates that apples occupy a distinct rele-
vant market in which Moonkissed engaged in anticompetitive
conduct. From the facts of the hypothetical, since Moonkissed
does not participate in the market for apples, Moonkissed cannot
have market or monopoly power with respect to apples because
apples occupy a separate relevant market from oranges. Moonk-
issed would therefore argue that any award of damages for
Jane's loss of apple sales would not relate to Moonkissed's behav-
ior in the market for oranges. 41 Moonkissed could bolster its
position by citing to cases where direct damages were not al-
lowed because of a failure to establish antitrust injury. 42 The
language of these cases could then be interpreted to imply that
consequential damages are therefore not recoverable as well.
Moonkissed could further strengthen its argument by citing to
the theoretical work of certain Chicago School academics. These
academics have argued that the proper measure of damages is
39 See Atlantic Richfield, 495 U.S. at 344 (holding antitrust injury requirement
"ensures that a plaintiff can recover only if the loss stems from competition reducing as-
pect or effect of the defendant's behavior").
40 See Broyles v. Wilson, 812 F. Supp. 651, 654 (M.D. La. 1993), affid, 3 F.3d 439 (5th
Cir. 1993) (holding market definition is essential to make out antitrust claim); see also
Gough v. Rossmoor, 585 F.2d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding merit in appellant's con-
tentions that appellee has failed to define relevant market).
41 Although Moonkissed's conduct eliminates Jane as a seller of apples, her share of
that market is too small to affect general competitive conditions in that market.
42 See, e.g., J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1531 (3d Cir.
1990) (stating that plaintiff must show extent of actual injury attributable to harm to
competition).
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determined by the "optimal deterrence" model.43 Under this
model, the ideal measure of damages to deter anticompetitive
conduct should be equal to the consumer welfare that is lost as a
result of the output reduction and/or price increase caused by the
conduct. Although theorists admit that the ideal measure of
damages can never be attained in the real world, they assert
that rules of recovery can be fashioned so that damage awards
approximate their ideal.44 This "optimal deterrence" model
would almost certainly preclude awards of consequential dam-
ages because such damages, by definition, do not approximate
the higher prices or foregone purchases suffered by consumers in
the relevant market affected by defendant's misconduct. In
other words, Jane's lost profits on apple sales do not approxi-
mate the higher prices consumers will have to pay for oranges as
a result of Moonkissed's conduct. 45
The importance of a relevant market definition to the defen-
dant's argument against consequential damages should not be
underestimated. In our hypothetical, this importance can be un-
derstood by considering Jane's attempt to recover damages for
the profits lost from the loss of fresh-squeezed orange juice sales.
If orange juice is included in the market for oranges, then Jane's
lost orange juice sales would not constitute consequential dam-
ages. Instead, they would be direct damages suffered as a result
of the defendant's misconduct. On the other hand, if orange juice
is not included in the relevant market, those losses are conse-
quential, and therefore subject to Moonkissed's attack.
This reliance on market definition has an ironic ramification.
43 See, e.g., William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 652, 676 (1983) (arguing optimal deterrence requires damage award to com-
petitor to depend on net harm, rather than on competitor's lost profits); William H. Page,
The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445, 1452 (1985)
(discussing standard of optimal deterrence, and noting optimal penalty would deter only
when welfare loss from reduction in competition outweighed gains in productive effi-
ciency).
44 See Page, supra note 43, at 1463. As is stated:
The practice that is prohibited must be predictably associated with the kind of harm
that the plaintiff alleges. The focus of antitrust injury thus shifts from proving ac-
tual causation in the particular case to an economic evaluation of the connection be-
tween the harm alleged and the inefficiency of the defendant's conduct.
Id.
45 See Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, "Speculative" Antitrust Damages, 70 WASH.
L. REV. 423, 427 (1995). The optimal deterrence theorists see antitrust injury and the
rule against speculative damages as the best doctrinal opportunities for courts to use in
imposing their agenda on litigants. Id.
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Typically, plaintiffs define the market as narrowly as possible in
order to increase the defendant's share in the defined market,
and thus strengthen the inference that the defendant possesses
market or monopoly power. 46 Conversely, defendants define the
market as broadly as possible to obtain the opposite result.47
But defendants' arguments against the availability of conse-
quential damages would turn those tendencies upside-down. If
the defendants' arguments prevail, plaintiffs would have an in-
centive to define the relevant market broadly enough to encom-
pass as much of their damages as possible, whereas defendants
would have the incentive to do the opposite.
C. Antitrust Injury and Consequential Damages: The Plaintiff's
Argument for Recovery
A plaintiff in Jane's position, arguing for consequential dam-
ages, would be best advised to cite the line of proximate cause
cases awarding such damages. Although some of the cases were
decided before the antitrust injury requirement was formulated,
they directly address the question of consequential damages,
whereas the antitrust injury cases cited by Moonkissed do not.
In this regard, Jane will argue that Moonkissed cannot cite any
case which explicitly held that the antitrust injury requirement
renders consequential damages categorically unavailable.
Furthermore, Jane can cite to cases that have held that conse-
quential damages are available even in light of the antitrust in-
jury requirement. Pre-eminent among this authority is Judge
Kennedy's (now Justice) dissenting opinion, in Ostrofe v. H.S.
Crocker Co.48 In Ostrofe, the plaintiff alleged that he had been
fired from his job and then boycotted in the industry for refusing
to participate in a price fixing scheme. In a divided opinion, the
Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had stated two cognizable
antitrust claims. 49 First, the court indicated that the plaintiff
46 See IRVING SCHER, ANTITRUST ADVISOR § 1.22 (4th ed. 1998).
47 See id.
48 See 740 F.2d 739, 751 (9th Cir. 1984) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that
plaintiffs claim should be dismissed because he should be pursuing remedies for wrong-
ful discharge, not treble damages for antitrust violations); see also Waterman S.S. Corp.
v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 257 (E.D. La. 1981) (noting that since
there were no antitrust injuries, consequential damages were not properly recoverable).
49 See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740 F.2d 739, 740-41. The court found Ostrofe had
"standing both as a direct boycott victim who sustained antitrust injury from the...
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had the requisite antitrust standing to assert a claim for the al-
leged group boycott. Second, the court found that he could "seek
treble damages based on his yearly salary as compensation for
injuries resulting from Crocker's [the defendant- employer] par-
ticipation in a price-fixing conspiracy in the labels market."50
Justice Kennedy agreed with the plaintiffs first claim, but
disagreed with the court as to the second. Justice Kennedy con-
cluded that this injury did not constitute antitrust injury, and
therefore, Ostrofe lacked antitrust standing to sue. 5 1 In the con-
text of this discussion, however, Justice Kennedy articulated the
key legal point supporting the position that consequential anti-
trust damages are available under the antitrust injury regime:
"We have on occasion included consequential damages in an anti-
trust award, but only when the plaintiff also has other damages
that are related to the decrease in competition."52 In other words,
Justice Kennedy concluded that Ostrofe's problem was not that
he was seeking consequential damages, but that he was doing so
without proving any direct damages at all.
In our hypothetical, Jane will assert Justice Kennedy's theory
concerning consequential damages. Justice Kennedy's analysis
begins with the proposition that consequential antitrust dam-
ages are those which do not independently satisfy the antitrust
injury test. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy stated that the rule
is that once the plaintiff establishes direct damages that satisfy
the consumer antitrust injury requirement, the plaintiff is enti-
tled to all damages proximately caused by that conduct, whether
direct or consequential. In other words, the plaintiff satisfies the
antitrust injury requirement when demonstrating the effects of
defendant's conduct in the relevant market. Once that conduct
is condemned, the proximate cause cases cited above hold that
market conspiracy," and "as a direct victim of a boycott undertaken as a means to ac-
complish the purpose of the price fixing conspiracy ... " Id.
50 See id. (arguing plaintiffs claim for treble damages "does not reflect or respond to
the breakdown in competition caused by the antitrust violation").
51 See id. at 750 (noting that "a treble damage measure 'unrelated to the size of the
injury increases the total social cost of antitrust enforcement" (citing William H. Page,
Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Appraoch to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI.
L. REV. 467, 497 (1980))); see also Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. v. Shell Oil Co., 998
F.2d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that plaintiff lacked standing because it failed to
show antitrust injury).
52 See Ostrofe, 740 F.2d at 751 (awarding lost profits and costs of defending sham
patent infringement suit (citing Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1300
(9th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis added).
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the plaintiff should be able to recover for all the harm suffered,
even if incurred outside the relevant market, as long as that
harm was proximately caused by defendant's misconduct.
Other cases support Justice Kennedy's analysis by applying a
similar two-step approach to consequential damage issues. The
first step is to determine whether the plaintiff has suffered any
antitrust injury from the defendant's conduct. The second step is
to treat the amount and type of damages as an issue of proxi-
mate cause. For example, in the case In re Lower Lake Erie Iron
Ore Antitrust Litigation,53 the court affirmed an award of dam-
ages by addressing antitrust injury at the outset and then dis-
cussing the damages issue in terms of reviewing evidence of cau-
sation. In Rebel Oil v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,5 4 the court did not
require that the antitrust injury flow only from the effects of de-
fendant's conduct, but instead allowed antitrust injury to follow
from the conduct itself.55 This analysis is in accord with the
awarding of consequential damages because these damages flow
from anticompetitive conduct, even though such damages do not
independently satisfy the antitrust injury requirement resulting
from an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. 56
Finally, in Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 57 the Ninth Circuit allowed lost profits not only for service
revenues resulting from the monopolist's refusal to sell parts to
53 998 F.2d 1144, 1168-76 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that "the direct nature of the injury
absorbs the question of causal connection"); see also City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn
Power Comp., 147 F.3d 256, 256 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting determination of antitrust injury
requires examining whether causal connection exists between alleged violation and in-jury).
54 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that "private plaintiffs can be compen-
sated only for injuries that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent").
55 See id. at 1433. "To show antitrust injury, a plaintiff must prove that his loss flows
from an anticompetitive aspect or effect of the defendant's behavior..." Id.; see also
Volmar Distribs. v. New York Post Co., 825 F. Supp. 1153, 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The
Volmar court indicated that plaintiff failed to "allege any 'competition-reducing aspect or
effect' of defendants' conduct." Id.
56 See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L.
REv. 1539, 1569-72 (1989). Antitrust injury exists when: (1) there is a logical connection
between defendant's misconduct and a decrease in competition; and (2) damage to plain-
tiff is a necessary consequence of misconduct. Id. Consequential damages that satisfy the
proximate cause standard will satisfy this proposed two-pronged test for establishing an-
titrust injury. Id.; see also Bogan v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 953 F. Supp. 532,
550 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The court stated that "[a]lthough the per se rule relieves plaintiff of
the burden of demonstrating an anticompetitive effect ..., it does not excuse a plaintiff
from showing that his injury was caused by the anticompetitive acts."Id.
57 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1560 (1998); see also Hand-
gards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1296 (1984) (holding that Handgards' lost
profits constituted type of injury antitrust laws were intended to prevent).
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independent service providers (direct damages), but also for lost
profits on used equipment the independent service providers
could not sell. The court reasoned that the refusal to sell en-
sured that there were no alternative means to having the
equipment serviced other than by the monopolist (consequential
damages). 58 Although the court did not refer to antitrust injury
specifically while discussing consequential damages, its atten-
tion to that requirement elsewhere in the opinion59 renders the
case positive authority supporting the theory that the antitrust
injury requirement does not forbid awards of consequential
damages as long as plaintiffs direct damages satisfy that re-
quirement. 60
Jane could also support her position through the use of aca-
demic literature. There is authority arguing against the Chicago
School theorists model of "optimal deterrence," a model which
almost certainly would preclude awards of consequential dam-
ages. One critic of the model is Professor Hovenkamp, 6 1 who has
argued that the optimal deterrence model erroneously ignores
the degree of harm suffered by the victims of anticompetitive
conduct and the manner in which those harms amplify the anti-
competitive effect of that conduct.62
58 See Image Technical Servs., Inc., 125 F.3d at 1224 n. 16 (indicating disaggregation
doctrine applied and vacating amount of consequential damages awarded); see also In re
Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d at 1165 n.16 (noting that there is
disaggregaton of damages requirement).
59 See Image Technical Servs., Inc., 125 F.3d at 1202 (stating plaintiff must establish
causal antitrust injury).
60 See Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 256, 258 (E.D.
La. 1981). Two steamship lines alleged that shipbuilders and their subcontractors con-
spired to restrain trade in the sale of certain vessels. Id. The court held that the plaintiffs
could clearly recover for any overcharges they paid for vessels resulting from the con-
spiracy since such overcharges would be the direct result of the conspiracy. Id. In reject-
ing the defendants' arguments that any further damages would fail to constitute anti-
trust injury, the court also ruled that the plaintiffs could recover any "property damages
and consequential damages" which were proximately caused by the conspiracy. Id. at
257-58.
61 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11
(1989) (noting Optimal Deterrence Model is concerned with deterrence of violators and
not compensation for its victims); see also Young v. Lehigh Corp., available in 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11575, at *38 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting doctrine of antitrust injury and stand-
ing have been misused, taken together they represent an "indirect approach to the stan-
dard of optimal deterrence").
62 See Hovenkamp, supra note 61, at 4-5 (arguing for anticipated profits as result of
antitrust violation); see also Hawker, supra note 37, at 128-30 (stating Supreme Court
believes Chicago School has as empirical matter, underestimated anticompetitive effects
of certain practices). See, e.g., C. Douglas Floyd, Antitrust Victims Without Antitrust
Remedies: The Narrowing of Standing in Private Antitrust Actions, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1,
5-7 (1997) (discussing difficulties in squaring this approach with intent of Congress).
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At a more fundamental level, Jane could support her position
by stressing to the court that the fundamental purpose of
awarding damages is two-fold: 1) deter anticompetitive conduct
by defendants; and 2) compensate victims of such conduct for the
harm they have suffered. 63 Although these two purposes may
sometimes conflict in application, Jane can argue that the award
of consequential damages fulfills both purposes.
Consequential damages fulfill the goal of deterrence by penal-
izing anticompetitive conduct that results in the loss of revenues
in other lines of business, an effect of the loss of business in the
relevant market. 64 Absent such awards, anticompetitive conduct
would be undeterred and thus a defendant might find it profit-
able to engage in anticompetitive conduct to benefit in conse-
quential aspects for which a defendant would not have to pay
damages. In appropriate cases, consequential damages also
fulfill the second purpose of antitrust damage awards by ensur-
ing that the victim is fully compensated for all losses proxi-
mately caused by the defendant's anticompetitive conduct. 65
Such a rule also finds support from damage awards in other ar-
eas of civil law that generally contemplate awards of consequen-
tial damages in appropriate cases.
63 See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) (noting that purposes of§
4 are to deter violators, deprive them of fruits of their illegality, and also to compensate
victims of antitrust violations for their injuries). But see Hawker, supra note 37, at 101
(stating that goal of damage awards is also to develop antitrust jurisprudence).
64 Of course, defendants would reply that, under the optimal deterrence model, de-
terrence of such consequences constitutes "overdeterrence." But see Image Technical
Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1357-58 (noting payment of lawyer's
fees as part of penalty for antitrust violation provides both specific and general deter-
rence).
65 See, e.g., Page, supra note 43, at 1457. The optimal deterrence commentators take
issue with this second purpose of damage awards and seek to limit compensation to only
the amount that will deter the specific loss to consumer welfare from the anticompetitive
conduct. Id. This discusses the possibility of developing a set of rules limiting scope of
liability that approximate standard of optimal deterrence without directly measuring ef-
ficiency effects. Id. The courts have never constrained the compensatory purpose of dam-
age awards to such a narrow role as to make that purpose merely redundant with the
purpose of deterrence. Doing so is difficult to reconcile with a legislative history showing
a Congressional desire to see victims compensated for their losses. Id.; see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, A Reassessment of Antitrust Remedies: Treble What?, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 95,
95 (1986). "Section 4 of the Clayton Act says treble the damages by him sustained." Id.
"This makes the remedy depend not on the extent to which the defendant has injured the
competitive process but on the identity of the plaintiff." Id.; Floyd, supra note 62, at 6.
Noting that the remedy under the statute should be confined to the class of persons Con-
gress intended to protect. Id.
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D. Consequential Damages and Antitrust Injury - The
Appropriate Standard
While the reader is free to draw his or her own conclusions,
the authors believe that Jane clearly has the more persuasive of
the two arguments presented. The cases cited by Moonkissed
are not directly on point, and furthermore, the optimal deter-
rence model has never been adopted by the Supreme Court or
the circuit courts. Lastly, Moonkissed's position is difficult to de-
fend when it contends that some of the harms resulting from a
violation of the antitrust laws should not be compensated. Ac-
cordingly, we expect the courts to adopt Justice Kennedy's posi-
tion. This position, once again, is that once a plaintiff estab-
lishes direct damages in satisfaction of the antitrust injury
requirement, all consequential damages proximately caused by a
defendant's misconduct may be recovered. Ultimately, the rules
of proximate cause preclude recovery for harms that are too re-
mote from the misconduct.
III. ANTITRUST STANDING
Antitrust standing "examines the connection between the as-
serted wrongdoing and the claimed injury to limit the class of po-
tential plaintiffs to those who are in the best position to vindi-
cate the antitrust infraction." 66  The "crux of the standing
analysis is whether the plaintiff is the proper party to vindicate
the antitrust interest."67 Confusion between the concepts of an-
titrust standing and antitrust injury arose in Associated General
Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,68
66 See Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391, 395 (7th
Cir. 1993) (finding that plaintiffs failed to show antitrust injury); see also M. Sean Royall,
Disaggregation of Antitrust Damages, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 311 (1997) (noting plaintiff
must show "some damage" that was caused by defendant's violation).
67 See Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp., 998 F.2d at 401 n. 13 (noting antitrust
injury and antitrust standing involve two separate inquiries); see also Associated Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 539 (1983)
(requiring evaluation of "plaintiffs harm, alleged wrongdoing by defendants, and rela-
tionship between them"); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 759-61 (1977)
(discussing various tests for antitrust standing employed by courts).
68 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (finding plaintiffs complaint did not sufficiently allege that
union was injured in its business or property by anything forbidden by antitrust laws).
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when the Supreme Court included antitrust injury as part of its
multi-factor antitrust standing test.69 It has now become clear
that whether antitrust injury is analyzed as a separate require-
ment or a decisive component of a more general standing test, is
largely a semantic difference. 70 In either event, the plaintiff
must demonstrate both an antitrust injury and a connection to
the anticompetitive conduct that is direct enough to satisfy a
balancing of the other standing factors identified in Associated
General.71
One component of the standing doctrine is especially pertinent
to the issue of antitrust consequential damages. Some cases
have stated that a plaintiff must be a consumer or a competitor
of the defendant to have standing. 72 These statements have a
sense of dicta about them because none of the courts were
squarely presented with the issue of whether any non-consumer
or non-competitor can have standing. Rather, these cases de-
cided whether the particular non-competitor or non-consumer
plaintiff had standing under the facts. More fundamentally, the
69 See id. at 539-41 (noting that if either firm had been injured by antitrust violation,
their injuries would be direct and they would have right to maintain their own treble
damage actions against defendants); see also Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591,
595-96 (7th Cir. 1995) (setting forth factors such as causal connection between antitrust
violation and plaintiffs injury, and speculative nature of claim and potential for duplica-
tive recovery when determining whether plaintiff is proper party to bring private action);
Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 797, 798 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing need for plaintiff to estab-
lish antitrust injury).
70 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 56, at 1551. "Whether these two tests are viewed
as components of a general test for antitrust standing or as separate tests with the first
addressing antitrust injury and the second addressing antitrust standing is functionally
inconsequential." Id.; see also Bell v. Dow Chem. Co., 847 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1988).
The court stated that antitrust injury is a component of standing inquiry, not separate
qualification. Id.
71 459 U.S. at 540-41 (stating factors include whether plaintiff is consumer or com-
petitor in market in which trade is restrained, directness of asserted injury, potential for
duplicative recovery, and existence of more direct victims of challenged conduct); see also
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 (1986) (discussing need for
injured party to be aggrieved by anticompetitive conduct); Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d
793, 798 n.9 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing factors that contribute to analysis of whether
plaintiff has antitrust standing); Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.,
998 F.2d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing distinctions between antitrust standing and
antitrust injury, even though concepts are often invoked interchangeably).
72 See, e.g., Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that
Sherman Act was enacted to assure customers benefits of price competition and to pro-
tect economic freedom in market); T.O. Bell v. Dow Chem. Corp., 847 F.2d 1179, 1183
(5th Cir. 1988) (denying plaintiff recovery for lack of standing, because he was neither
consumer nor competitor in relevant market); Eagle v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 812 F.2d
538, 540 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that party alleging injury must be either consumer or
competitor in restrained market); General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810
F.2d 795, 809 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that standing to sue under Sherman Act is limited
to consumer or competitor that proximately suffers injury).
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idea that only consumers and competitors have standing is con-
tradicted by other cases that grant standing to a particular non-
consumer or non-competitor under the facts presented. 73 One
court has gone so far as to say: "The circuits are split, however,
over the question of whether a plaintiff must be either a con-
sumer or competitor in the market harmed by the antitrust vio-
lation at issue in order to establish antitrust injury."74
This aspect of the standing doctrine may potentially affect re-
covery of consequential damages in an antitrust case. As articu-
lated above, the proper rule of antitrust consequential damages
should result in the award of such damages whenever the plain-
tiff can prove antitrust injury from the defendant's conduct, and
that the conduct proximately caused her consequential damages.
Following the cases that state that only consumers or competi-
tors have standing, however, could result in an additional re-
quirement: Allowing consequential damages only when the
plaintiff is a consumer or competitor of the defendant.
Perhaps returning to our hypothetical will clarify the matter.
Jane is not a competitor or consumer of Moonkissed in the mar-
ket for selling apples. This fact could present a standing prob-
lem if one forgets that Jane has already established her standing
as the defendant's competitor in the market for selling oranges.
Once a plaintiff has established standing to sue, no antitrust
case has held that she need establish standing independently for
each and every component of her damages. In this area, as in
the analysis of antitrust injury, once the plaintiff has satisfied
73 See, e.g., Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 962-63 (10th Cir.
1990) (citing Supreme Court as noting that statute "does not confine its protection to
consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors"); Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v.
NFL, 791 F. 2d 1356, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that injury such as that suffered by
plaintiff could not be characterized as "an indirect ripple effect"); National Bancard Corp.(NaBanco) v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1231, 1241-47 (S.D. Fla. 1984), offd., 779 F.
2d 592, 596 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting Supreme Court's suggestion that courts "analyze
each situation in light of the factors set forth' in its analysis of plaintiffs standing posi-
tion in the case before it"); Fine v. Barry & Enright Prods., 731 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir.
1984) (discussing Court's endorsement of four factor "intention and preparedness" test to
grant standing to plaintiff who is prospective entrant to business or industry); Crimpers
Promotions, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724 F.2d 290, 291-92 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding
that plaintiff need not be direct competitor in market in which defendant operates);
Chelson v. Oregonian Publ'g Co., 715 F.2d 1368, 1370-72 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that na-
ture of relationship between alleged antitrust violation and alleged injury "depends on
facts in dispute, thus those facts are material to the outcome of this case").
74 See Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1994) (refusing to resolve this
conflict because plaintiff could not support its claim of antitrust injury); see also Floyd,
supra note 62, at 6 (rejecting consumer or competitor limitation on antitrust standing).
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the basic standing requirement, the damages she may receive
should be controlled by the doctrine of proximate causation.
This approach in itself raises a possible anomaly. Suppose for
a moment that a consumer named Frank buys oranges from su-
permarkets at a reduced rate shortly before they spoil. Frank
squeezes these oranges and sells the juice. Moonkissed, al-
though a cartel of orange sellers itself, has no market or monop-
oly power in the market for fresh-squeezed orange juice. If
Frank brings suit for profits lost in orange juice sales, Moonk-
issed will claim Frank lacks standing. Since Frank buys the or-
anges from supermarkets, he is not a consumer of Moonkissed.
Because Moonkissed lacks market power in the market for fresh-
squeezed orange juice, Frank is not a competitor of Moonkissed
in the market in which the anticompetitive activity allegedly
took place (the market for oranges). These facts do not bode well
for Frank's chances of establishing standing under the line of
cases limiting standing to competitors and consumers.
If that line of cases is followed, the anomaly is that Jane can
recover for her damages from lost sales of fresh-squeezed orange
juice, whereas Frank cannot simply because of the fortuity that
Jane also competes with Moonkissed in another market, which
happens to be the relevant market for liability purposes. In all
other respects, the loss of orange juice sales by Jane are indis-
tinguishable from those sales lost by Frank. A defendant might
argue that Frank is simply more remote from the alleged mis-
conduct, much like the labor union in Associated General. A
plaintiff in Frank's position may respond that the anomaly illus-
trates why the line of cases limiting standing to consumers or
competitors is mistaken. Given the conceptual weakness of
those cases, plaintiffs appear to have the better of the two argu-
ments, but the definitive resolution of the question has yet to be
determined by any court.
IV. DISAGGREGATION
It is a long-standing maxim of antitrust law that plaintiffs
must prove the facts of their injury with some rigor, but that
there is a more lenient standard for proving the amount of dam-
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ages. 75 The rationale for this rule is that "[t]he vagaries of the
marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge of what plaintiffs
situation would have been in the absence of defendant's antitrust
violation," but a defendant should not be allowed to profit by the
uncertainty created by his misconduct. 76
Despite this commonly accepted principle, circuit courts have
adopted a number of rules imposing fairly strict limitations on
how a plaintiff may prove the amount of her damage. 77 One
such limitation is known as the disaggregation doctrine. Under
this doctrine, a plaintiff who alleges that the defendant engaged
in more than one anticompetitive practice must tailor her dam-
age claim so that she "can prove the amount of damages flowing
from each separate area of anticompetitive conduct." 78  Other-
wise, the fact-finder will have "no rational basis on which to cor-
relate the damages to the particular conduct found to be preda-
tory or anticompetitive" 79 in the event that the fact-finder
determines that some of the defendant's practices were anticom-
petitive and others were not.80
The disaggregation doctrine has been both praised 81 and criti-
cized,8 2 but has been generally accepted without difficulty. Al-
75 See Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 566
(1931) (stating that "if the damage is certain, the fact that its extent is uncertain does not
prevent a recovery"); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100, 124 (1969) (stating that fact that damages are uncertain does not preclude recovery
because any other rule would enable wrongdoer to profit at expense of his victim); George
R. Whitten Jr. Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 125, 137 (D. Mass. 1974),
aff'd 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974) (stating that "damages need not be demonstrated with
absolute certainty and this is especially true in antitrust cases").
76 See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981)
(expressing Court's willingness to accept degree of uncertainty because of difficulty in
ascertaining damages).
77 See Blair & Page, supra note 45, at 435-36 (noting that plaintiff must account for
effect of numerous other factors).
78 See Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 497 F. Supp. 230, 247 (D. Conn. 1980), rev'd.
in part and vacated in part, 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing that defendant's evi-
dence on damages consisted of studies and calculations).
79 See Northeastern Tel. Co., 497 F. Supp. at 248 (noting lack of this rational basis if
damages had not been tied to specific claims of anticompetitive conduct).
80 See Litton Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785, 825 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that courts
have held that damage studies are inadequate when only some of conduct complained of
is found to be wrongful and damage study cannot be disaggregated).
81 See Royall, supra note 66, at 312 (arguing that disaggregation rule furthers pur-
poses of treble-damage remedy by avoiding speculation in calculation of antitrust dam-
ages and preventing recovery of treble damages for injuries that flow causes other than
defendant's unlawful conduct).
82 See, e.g., Charles N. Charnas, Segregation of Antitrust Damages: An Excessive
Burden on Private Plaintiffs, 72 CAL. L. REV. 403, 421 (1984) (criticizing courts' fears of
speculative damage awards as "exaggerated"); James R. McCall, The Disaggregation of
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though the requirement may seem simple enough, it can impose
daunting obstacles to recovery in practical application. These
difficulties can be appreciated by reference to one of the leading
disaggregation cases, MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T.83
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had engaged in twenty-
two separate monopolistic practices. 84 The jury ultimately found
ten unlawful.85 The plaintiff would have had to provide a dam-
age study that valued each of the twenty-two practices 86 in order
to present a damage claim that would withstand a disaggrega-
tion challenge. This task may not seem too burdensome in a
multi-million dollar suit, until one recalls that a plaintiff may re-
cover damages if an act is a material cause of her injury even
though it is not the sole cause of her injury.87
Accordingly, if the plaintiff in MCI Communications had pro-
duced a damage study assigning a value to each of the twenty-
two practices it challenged, it would also have to produce a grid
showing what awards would be proper depending on the combi-
nations of practices found unlawful because the award study
might otherwise engage in double counting. For example, if two-
thirds of the damages caused by challenged practice number
three would also have been suffered by challenged practice num-
ber seven alone, the damage study would have to make that fact
clear to avoid both double counting if both practices were found
illegal and disaggregation challenges if only one practice was
found illegal. The permutations of damage combinations among
Damages Requirement in Private Monopolization Actions, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 643,
662 (1987) (discussing that disaggregation requirement does not accord with factor
analysis in antitrust standing).
83 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
84 708 F.2d at 1092.
85 See id. at 1092-93. Seven had been eliminated by defendant's summary judgment
motion and the jury rejected five. Id.
86 Compare Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690, 699
(1963) (stating that plaintiffs are entitled to have their allegations of conspiracy consid-
ered in aggregate and not have each piece of evidence concerning the conspiracy
"compartmentalized" and then forgotten when next piece is considered), with Southern
Pac. Comm. Co. v. AT&T, 556 F. Supp. 825, 1091 n.337 (D.D.C. 1983), afrd., 740 F.2d 980
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that Continental Ore supports applying disaggregation doc-
trine).
87 See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9
(1969) (noting that plaintiffs "need not exhaust all possible alternative sources of injury"
to prove compensable injury under Section 4); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston,
735 F.3d 1555, 1564 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (noting that plaintiff "need only prove with
a fair degree of certainty that the defendant's illegal conduct materially contributed to
his injury").
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the twenty-two challenged practices in MCI Communications
could become virtually infinite once one accounts for this possi-
bility of mutual overlap.
This task becomes even more difficult because the plaintiff
must also distinguish the losses suffered due to anticompetitive
conduct from exogenous factors such as economic fluctuations or
her own mismanagement.88 Some of the courts adopting the
disaggregation doctrine require that the plaintiffs damage study
segregate the amount of losses caused by each anticompetitive
practice from such exogenous factors. However, since a plain-
tiffs damage study must typically be produced in advance of
trial, she may not be aware of all the exogenous factors to be as-
serted by the defendant or introduced by third party witnesses
on the stand, much less anticipate which of these factors will be
adopted or rejected by the fact-finder. Asking the plaintiff to
anticipate all these possibilities in advance of trial amounts to
sheer speculation.
When the complications introduced by multiple causation and
exogenous factors are considered, plaintiffs in cases challenging
multiple practices appear highly unlikely to have a damage
study that will exactly correspond to the ultimate findings of the
trial court. In such cases, costly second trials on damages are a
virtual certainty. Many plaintiffs might consider themselves
lucky to only face the prospect of a retrial on damages, in light of
disaggregation cases that hold that failure to disaggregate man-
dates a new trial on liability as well as damages,8 9 or outright
judgment in defendant's favor.90 Raising such high hurdles to
the likelihood of recovery hardly seems designed to encourage
88 See, e.g., National Assoc. of Review Appraisers & Mortgage Underwriters v. Ap-
praisal Found., 64 F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that there was no recovery
for losses due to factors other than defendant's anticompetitive violations); Alexander v.
National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1210 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that plaintiffs must
show that defendants "exclusionary behavior was a material cause of the harm suffered,"
in order to prove sufficient causal nexus).
89 See, e.g., Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931)
(holding partial new trial "may not properly be resorted to unless it clearly appears that
the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone
may be had without injustice"); Brooks v. Brattleboro Mem'l Hosp., 958 F.2d 525, 531 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding that because "issues of liability and damages are inextricably inter-
twined ... there must be a retrial on all issues").
90 See, e.g., Southern Pac. Comm. Co. v. AT&T, 556 F. Supp. 825, 1098 (D.D.C. 1983),
affd., 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (dismissing case after finding that no injury was es-
tablished and furthermore, that damage claim did not provide any basis for court to
make "just and reasonable" approximation of amount of damages).
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prosecution of the antitrust laws by "private attorneys gen-
eral,"91 prosecutions which have long been thought crucial to en-
forcement of the antitrust laws.92
Disaggregation simply facilitates the application of the anti-
trust injury doctrine as a substantive limitation on the recovery
of antitrust damages. 93 If consequential damages are to be
awarded, they simply must be disaggregated along with all other
damages. However, consequential damage claims tend to involve
more tangled lines of causation than do direct damage claims,
since consequential damages do not occur in the relevant market
that is the subject of inquiry during the liability portion of the
trial. Therefore, in certain cases, disaggregating consequential
damage claims to the extent they result from some of defendant's
challenged practices, accounts for potential causal overlaps.
These overlaps may arise from the difficulty in determining the
amount of damages resulting from exogenous factors (other than
defendant's misconduct), and could make the burden imposed by
the disaggregation doctrine even more daunting.
There are certain safety valves in the disaggregation doctrine.
For example, courts have stated that disaggregation will not be
required where it is impracticable. 94 Further, courts have held
that disaggregation is not required where the challenged con-
duct, although not found illegal, would cease when the illegal
conduct ceased. 95 Finally, if the challenged practices found ille-
gal would have caused all of plaintiffs damages, even though
some challenged practices were found lawful, it will not be nec-
essary to disaggregate. 96 Sensitive application of these aspects
91 See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826-
27 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that claims under antitrust laws are not private matter and
that Congress "did not intend such claims to be resolved elsewhere than in the courts").
92 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635
(1985) (discussing that Sherman Act is designed to promote national interest of competi-
tive markets).
93 See Royall, supra note 66, at 323.
94 See, e.g., Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 584 F.2d 1226, 1242-43 (7th Cir.
1982) affd. on other grounds, 465 U.S. 752 (1984). The burden then shifts to the defen-
dant to show disaggregation is possible. Id.
95 See Litton Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785, 825 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that even
though some courts have held that damage studies are inadequate when only some con-
duct complained of is found to be wrongful and damage study cannot be disaggregated, in
this case, there existed evidentiary basis for jury to award lost profits).
96 See National Farmers Org., Inc. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 850 F.2d 1286,
1306-07 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff need only present evidence as to amount of
its damages sufficient to allow finder of fact to make just and reasonable estimate not
based on speculation).
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of the disaggregation doctrine may prevent the doctrine from
rendering the legal operation of consequential damages too pro-
cedurally onerous to be realized other than in theory.
CONCLUSION
Consequential damages in antitrust cases, although rarely dis-
cussed, have traditionally come under the doctrine of proximate
causation. The antitrust injury requirement that has evolved
over the last twenty years has provided defendants with an ar-
gument against awarding consequential damages, but it is an
argument that should not, and has not, prevailed. In addition,
antitrust injury and the standing doctrine generally should con-
tinue to act as screening devices against claims in their entirety.
Once a plaintiff has satisfied these requirements, her entitle-
ment to consequential damages should continue to be deter-
mined by the proximate cause doctrine. The difficulty of proving
the link between defendant's misconduct and the amount of con-
sequential damages to be awarded may sometimes be increased
by the disaggregation doctrine, but such claims are nevertheless
subject to proof in appropriate cases.
An intriguing aspect of the study of antitrust consequential
damages is how the issue provides an example of the debates
that exist in the law of antitrust. In this small corner of the law,
one witnesses the jousting between Chicagoan theorists and
their opponents, and the tension between deterring consumer
welfare losses and compensating companies who make consumer
welfare possible. Finally, one witnesses how the seemingly
straight lines of antitrust economic analysis, such as the man-
date to disaggregate, become hopelessly tangled when confronted
by reality, where evidence is often conflicting and incomplete,
and causation is often difficult and multi-faceted. None of these
conflicts looks to be resolved soon. Rather, they seem certain to
continue in both the narrow issue of consequential damages and
the more general field of antitrust jurisprudence as the Sherman
Act experiences its second century of development.
